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PHILIP MORRIS USA v. WILLIAMS: A 
CONFUSING DISTINCTION 
SACHIN BANSAL* 
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,1 the United States Supreme 
Court held 5-4 that it is unconstitutional under the Due Process 
Clause2 of the Constitution for a jury to award punitive damages for 
harm caused to individuals other than the plaintiff. Thus, the Court 
concluded that, under the Constitution, a trial court could not levy 
punitive damages out of a desire to punish a company for injuries it 
inflicts upon others who are “essentially, strangers to the litigation.”3 
However, the Court confusingly drew a narrow and arguably 
contradictory distinction to justify its holding. Under Philip Morris 
USA, a jury may not use punitive damages “to punish a defendant 
directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on 
nonparties,” but a jury is still permitted to consider the harm to third 
parties to determine the “reprehensibility” of the defendant’s conduct, 
one of the three factors in assessing the constitutionality of punitive 
damages.4 Justice Ginsburg in her dissent wrote that the distinction 
“slips from my grasp.”5 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams arose from the death of Jesse 
Williams, an Oregon janitor who smoked as many as three packs of 
Marlboro cigarettes6 a day for forty-seven years and died in 1997 of 
lung cancer at the age of sixty-seven.7 The smoker’s widow, Mayola 
Williams, brought a lawsuit against Philip Morris, on behalf of her 
 
 * 2008 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007); 547 U.S. __ (2007). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 3. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1063. 
 4. Id. at 1064 (emphasis added). 
 5. Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 6. Philip Morris is the manufacturer of Marlboro cigarettes. Id. at 1060 (majority opinion). 
 7. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Weigh Limits on Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2006, at A17. 
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husband, in an Oregon state court in 1999 for negligence and deceit.8 
Mrs. Williams alleged that her husband never believed that cigarettes 
were a health risk because tobacco companies such as Philip Morris 
repeatedly insisted they were safe.9 She testified at trial that only after 
contracting cancer did her husband tell her that “[t]hose darn 
cigarette people finally did it. They were lying all the time.”10 
The Oregon jury found that smoking caused Mr. Williams’s death, 
that he smoked “in significant part” because he thought it was safe, 
and that Philip Morris “knowingly and falsely led him to believe that 
this was so.”11 The jury found both Philip Morris and Mr. Williams 
negligent, but on the issue of deceit, the jury awarded the plaintiff 
with approximately $821,000 in compensatory damages.12 The jury 
also tacked on a punitive damage award of $79.5 million to penalize 
Philip Morris for what it called a “massive market-directed fraud” 
that convinced individuals such as Jesse Williams that smoking was 
not dangerous or addictive.13 
The trial judge, adhering to the principles of BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore,14 reduced the punitive damage award to $32 
million.15 The Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million 
award, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision.16 Philip 
Morris subsequently filed a writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court,17 and the Supreme Court remanded the case in light 
of the its decision in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Campbell.18 
Thereafter, the Oregon Court of Appeals, and subsequently the 
Oregon Supreme Court, again affirmed the $79.5 million punitive 
damage award.19 Philip Morris once again sought certiorari.20 
 
 8. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1060. 
 9. See Bill Mears, Widow Takes Husband’s Dying Wish to Supreme Court, CNN, Oct. 31, 
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/10/31/scotus.tobacco/index.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1061. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Robert Barnes, Justices Overturn Tobacco Award, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2007, at A1. 
 14. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that excessively high 
punitive damages violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution). 
 15. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1061. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003) (No. 
02-1553). 
 18. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that punitive 
damages may only be based on the acts of the defendants which harmed the plaintiffs). 
 19. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1061. 
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In Gore, the Supreme Court reversed a $2-million punitive 
damage award, finding that it was “grossly excessive” because it was 
500 times the amount of the plaintiff’s compensatory damages, and 
that it violated the defendant’s substantive due process rights.21 Gore 
set forth three “guideposts,” or factors, used to assess whether a 
defendant has notice of the potential damages such that a high 
punitive damages award is constitutional: (1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio between the 
plaintiff’s punitive damages award and the actual harm suffered, as 
measured against the compensatory award (i.e. the award-to-harm 
ratio); and (3) the difference between the plaintiff’s punitive damages 
award and the other penalties that the defendant could have incurred 
for engaging in similar behavior.22 
For purposes of Philip Morris USA and this commentary, the first 
and second factors are most important. In fact, in Gore, the Court 
announced that reprehensibility was “[p]erhaps the most important 
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.”23 On 
this count, the Court outlined a general continuum of reprehensibility, 
with non-violent and negligent acts at one end of the spectrum, and 
violent, deceitful, and intentional acts at the other.24 
Subsequently, in State Farm, the Court revisited and reaffirmed all 
three factors. The court also provided further guidance for courts to 
consider when determining a defendant’s reprehensibility: whether 
the harm caused was physical or economic; whether the plaintiff was 
financially vulnerable; whether the tortious act was isolated or 
recurring; and whether the act was intentional or accidental.25 
Specifically, the Court held that in assessing the award-to-harm 
ratio, courts may take both “actual” and “potential” harm into 
account.26 Though declining to endorse a bright-line rule for the ratio 
between a plaintiff’s harm and the plaintiff’s punitive damages 
award,27 the Court stated that the ratio between punitive and 
 
 20. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256). 
 21. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996). 
 22. Id. at 574–75. 
 23. Id. at 575. 
 24. Id. at 576. 
 25. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
 26. Id. at 424–25. 
 27. Id. at 425. 
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compensatory awards should be within the single digits because “few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.”28 In addition, the 
Court wrote that “[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport 
with due process . . . than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1 . . . or, 
in this case, of 145 to 1.”29 The court further reasoned that if a 
plaintiff’s compensatory award is already high, then a lesser ratio 
between the awards may be warranted, because a high compensatory 
award is generally sufficient, in itself, to make the plaintiff whole.30 In 
such a case, “[a] lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory 
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process 
guarantee.”31 Still, the Court identified one potential exception where 
a higher award-to-harm ration might be justified: cases where “a 
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of 
economic damages.”32 
II.  KEY FINDINGS 
The Court’s essential holding in Philip Morris USA v. Williams is 
that a State may not use a punitive damages award to punish a 
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those 
“essentially, strangers to the litigation.”33 Such an award would 
amount to an unconstitutional “taking of ‘property’ from the 
defendant without due process.”34 Without this rule, a defendant 
would be subjected to a “near standardless” damages determination, 
without fair notice of the punishment to be imposed and without the 
opportunity to fully refute the alleged harm to nonparties.35 
Furthermore, “the fundamental due process concerns . . . —risks of 
arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of notice—will be magnified.”36 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 33. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (emphasis in original). 
 34. Id. at 1060. 
 35. Id. at 1063 (Justice Breyer questioning “How many such victims are there? How 
seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not likely 
answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to speculate.”). 
 36. Id. 
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The Court then proceeded to further refine the first factor of 
reprehensibility initially announced in BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore37 and subsequently clarified in State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance v. Campbell.38 Although a jury cannot punish a defendant 
directly for harms inflicted on nonparties, it can consider nonparty 
harm in assessing the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct.39 The 
Court wrote that: 
Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the 
conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of 
harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible  . 
. . [yet] a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive 
damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of 
harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties.40 
The holding effectively vacated the Oregon jury’s $79.5 million 
punitive damage award, and the Court remanded the case to the 
Oregon Supreme Court to apply the new constitutional standard 
prohibiting a jury from punishing harm to nonparties.41 The Court 
accepted Philip Morris’s argument that the jury could only punish the 
company for the harm done to Mr. Williams, not to other smokers.42 
Perhaps the trial level plaintiff’s attorney, who asked the jury to 
“think about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years in the 
state of Oregon there have been,” influenced this action.43 
The Court also found that the Oregon trial court had improperly 
rejected Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction, which reflected the 
narrow distinction echoed by the Court’s decision. The proposed 
instruction, according to Philip Morris, would have explicitly told the 
jury that other smokers, no matter how tragic their stories, would have 
to prove their own cases:44 
 
 37. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996). 
 38. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
 39. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1064. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1065. 
 42. Id. at 1061; Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 
(No. 05-1256) (Philip Morris’s counsel stating that “[t]he whole essence of the idea that we were 
trying to convey . . . is to confine the jury to its proper domain and its domain is the case before 
it.”) (emphasis added). 
 43. Barnes, supra note 13. 
 44. Pete Yost, Court Hears Cigarette Co. Penalty Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/10/31/high_court_to_hear_tobacco
_firms_appeal/?rss_id=Boston.com+%2F+News. 
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Although you may consider the extent of harm suffered by others 
in determining what the reasonable relationship is [between a 
punitive damage award and the harm to Mr. Williams from Philip 
Morris’s misconduct], you are not to punish the defendant for the 
impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring 
lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve their 
claims.45 
The Court agreed with this proposed instruction, and found that it set 
the proper balance between assessing reprehensibility for harm to 
nonparties and punishing the company for such harm to others.46 
Therefore, part of the Court’s rationale for remanding the case to the 
Oregon Supreme Court was for the lower court to more clearly 
explain the trial court’s basis for rejecting the proposed instruction. 
This rationale comes to light through statements made by Justice 
Breyer in oral argument: “what’s worrying me about this is . . . that 
we’re going to be in a kind of bog of mixtures of constitutional law, 
unclear Oregon state law, not certain exactly what was meant by 
whom in the context of a trial. . . .”47 His confusion foreshadowed the 
Court’s ultimate decision to remand the case. Breyer’s majority 
opinion agreed with Justice Souter’s sentiment that “isn’t it perhaps 
the better . . . course to send this back to [Oregon] and say, we don’t 
know what you mean.”48 
Although it remanded the case, the Court did not require or 
stipulate any particular wording in the form of a jury instruction that 
would satisfy its new constitutional standard.49 Instead, the Court 
simply stated that the Due Process Clause50 requires states to “provide 
assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, 
not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm 
caused strangers.”51 
 
 45. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1068–69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 1064; see Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 
(No. 05-1256) (Chief Justice Roberts noting that “I understood what the instruction sought to 
draw, it’s a fine line but the reason . . . is because of our prior cases, and it tried to draw that 
distinction between assessing reprehensibility and punishing for harm to others.”). 
 47. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256). 
 48. Id. at 36. 
 49. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Overturn $79.5 Million Tobacco Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
21, 2007, at A14. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 51. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1064. 
2008__06 -- BANSAL__FMT.DOC 12/30/2008 4:35:44 PM 
2007] PHILLIP MORRIS USA V. WILLIAMS 55 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams may be analyzed in three ways. 
First, the majority’s distinction is contradictory, confusing, and too 
narrow. On the one hand, the holding is that a jury cannot award 
punitive damages to a plaintiff based on a defendant’s alleged harms 
to third parties, but the jury can still consider harms to nonparties in 
assessing reprehensibility. One commentator wrote that the 
distinction was “shaved so thin you could roll a cigarette in it.”52 
Another commentator found it lacking in clarity, stating that the case 
is an example of “what happens when you’re lucky enough to be in a 
position to delegate to others the implementation of unworkable 
rules.”53 Some experts have also characterized the distinction as being 
“incoherent”54 and “hazy.”55 
Thus, a jury violates a defendant’s due process rights if it inflicts 
punishment by imposing a punitive damage award for harm caused to 
nonparties, but it can properly take into account that “conduct that 
risks harm to many is likely more reprehensible than conduct that 
risks harm to only a few.”56 If a jury cannot punish for harm to the 
“strangers”57 of the litigation, it is difficult to understand why it can 
consider that harm at all. How can a jury consider harm to others, but 
withhold that consideration in its punishment calculus? In her dissent, 
Justice Ginsburg notes this paradox: “[a] judge seeking to enlighten 
rather than confuse surely would resist delivering the requested 
charge.”58 
Justice Stevens, who was the author for the majority in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore59 and in the majority in State Farm Mutual 
 
 52. Ann Woolner, Editorial, High Court Ruling in Altria Isn’t Worth the Wait, 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 23, 2007, at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid= 
aAjZU7KgnzLE&refer=columnist_woolner. 
 53. Douglas W. Kmiec, Editorial, Up in Smoke, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2007, at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2160286/fr/flyout. 
 54. E-mail from Erwin Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Professor of 
Political Science, Duke University, to Sachin Bansal (Feb. 20, 2006, 17:06 EST) (on file with 
author). 
 55. Posting of Aaron M. Street, aaron.m.street@bakerbotts.com, to SUPREME COURT 
TODAY (Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with author). 
 56. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1065. 
 57. Id. at 1063. 
 58. Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 59. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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Auto Insurance v. Campbell,60 joined the dissent61 in Philip Morris 
USA. He made arguments similar to Justice Ginsburg and criticized 
the majority’s reprehensibility and direct punishment distinction62 as a 
“nuance [that] eludes me.”63 If a jury considers nonparty harm to 
assess a defendant’s responsibility, that jury “by definition” punishes a 
defendant “directly” for third party harm.64 This implies that a jury 
considers nonparty harm in setting punitive damages regardless. Thus, 
there is no practical difference between directly punishing a 
defendant for harming nonparties and increasing a defendant’s 
punishment because harm to a single plaintiff was more 
“reprehensible” given its potential harm to others.65 According to 
Stevens, the majority “endorses a contrary conclusion without 
providing . . . any reasoned justification.”66 
Second, the majority specifically declined to address a key 
question in the case: whether a punitive damage award that is greater 
than the compensatory damage award can be considered 
unconstitutionally excessive.67 Although this was an issue for which 
the Court granted certiorari, the Court refused to resolve whether a 
punitive award almost one-hundred times that of the compensatory 
damages is excessive under the Constitution. The Court rationalized 
this refusal by providing a new constitutional standard: the Oregon 
Supreme Court could either order a new trial or change the level of 
the punitive damage award.68 Thus, the Court did not articulate what 
amount of punitive damages was excessive, nor did it provide an 
appropriate ratio of compensatory to punitive damages.69 
All four of the dissenting justices alluded to a belief that the 
punitive damage award in Philip Morris USA was not excessive 
 
 60. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 61. See Posting of James R. Copland to PointofLaw.com, http://www.pointoflaw.com/ 
archives/003568.php (Feb. 20, 2007). 
 62. Id. at 1066–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1062 (majority opinion). 
 68. Id. at 1065. 
 69. See Jess Bravin & Vanessa O’Connell, High Court Denies Altria Damages, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 21, 2007, at A2. 
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because of the company’s egregiousness70 in conducting a “massive 
market directed fraud.”71 Justice Stevens specifically agreed with this 
view, stating that Philip Morris’s wrongdoing was outrageous “for 
engaging in a campaign of deceit in distributing a poisonous and 
addictive substance to thousands of cigarette smokers statewide,”72 
thereby suggesting that the company deserved the enormous punitive 
award imposed on it. Justice Stevens also took comfort in the fact that 
the punitive damages were largely awarded to the state instead of to 
the “private litigant.”73 
Under Oregon law, sixty percent of a punitive damage award is 
distributed to a state crime victims’ fund, and of the remaining forty 
percent that is awarded to the prevailing party, only a maximum of 
twenty percent can be awarded to the attorney for that party.74 This 
procedural safeguard helps to ensure that a defendant was not 
unfairly punished and defers to the State to address any due process 
issues without federal intervention.75 Justice Ginsburg also agreed 
with this federalism viewpoint, preferring to “accord more respectful 
treatment to the proceedings and dispositions of state courts.”76 Both 
Justice Ginsburg77 and Justice Stevens78 fully believed that the Oregon 
Supreme Court had carefully followed the Court’s earlier precedents 
in punitive damages and would have voted to affirm the lower court’s 
decision. 
 
 70. See Roger Parloff, Editorial, Punitive Damages Ruling: Narrow, Confusing Victory for 
Business, FORTUNE, Feb. 20, 2007, at http://money.cnn.com/blogs/legalpad/2007/02/punitive-
damages-ruling-narrow.html. 
 71. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-
1256). 
 72. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 1066 (“This justification for punitive damages has even greater salience when, as 
in this case, the award is payable in whole or in part to the State rather than to the private 
litigant.”). 
 74. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1). 
 75. Tony Mauro, Punitive Damages Case Could Return to Oregon Supreme Court, LEGAL 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at http://www.law.com/jsp/dc/PubArticleDC.jsp?id=1162289114222. 
 76. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 1068 (“Vacation of the Oregon Supreme Court’s judgment, I am convinced, is 
unwarranted.”). 
 78. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Oregon Supreme Court faithfully applied 
the reasoning in those opinions to the egregious facts disclosed by this record . . . . [N]o 
procedural error even arguably justifying reversal occurred at the trial in this case.”). 
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Third, the alignment of the justices was unusual with “liberals” 
and “conservatives” grouped on both sides.79 Here, the majority was 
comprised of Justices Breyer, Roberts, Kennedy, Souter, and Alito, 
and dissenting were Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Thomas, and Scalia.80 
However, in the punitive damages jurisprudence, the justices are not 
traditionally split along the usual conservative-liberal lines.81 For 
example, the more liberal Justices Breyer and Souter have regularly 
voted to limit punitive damages, whereas the more conservative 
Justices Scalia and Thomas refused to do so.82 Justice Thomas’s dissent 
in Philip Morris USA reiterated his originalist viewpoint that “the 
Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages 
awards.”83 This provides further proof that politically conservative 
justices are not unilaterally pro-business justices, because a pro-
business perspective would be to limit punitive damages.84 
In addition, commentators viewed the case closely to test how 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would approach the punitive 
damages issue.85 Instead of providing new insight, both justices 
essentially duplicated the votes of their predecessors, former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, who both supported 
limitations on punitive damages as members of the majority in Gore86 
and in State Farm.87 Although it appears that the Court’s new makeup 
does not change its prior rulings limiting punitive damages, one 
commentator noted that the Court’s narrow distinction and its 
deliberate avoidance of the excessiveness issue “raised the question of 
whether, beneath the surface stability, the [C]ourt’s polarity may have 
shifted.”88 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 79. Posting of Ashby Jones to Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/02/20/supreme-
court-overturns-795-million-punitives-award/ (Feb. 20, 2007, 10:59 EST). 
 80. Id. at 1057. 
 81. David G. Savage, High Court Debate Could Put Cap On Punishing Jury Awards, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, at A12. 
 82. See generally BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 83. Philip Morris USA, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 84. Parloff, supra note 70. 
 85. Savage, supra note 81. 
 86. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 87. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 88. Greenhouse, supra note 49. 
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Due to its broad policy implications, Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams is one of the most significant cases to the business 
community. It was the first time that the Court reviewed a health or 
personal injury matter89 with the potential to affect a wide variety of 
businesses—ranging from automakers to insurers. This community has 
consistently sought to limit punitive damage awards. One scholar said 
that the business interests involved were aiming for a “grand slam” to 
advocate for tighter restrictions and limits on what juries may award 
to punish corporations.90 Amici in support of Philip Morris included 
the Chamber of Commerce,91 the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers,92 the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America,93 the American Insurance Association,94 and other business-
focused trade associations. 
In general, the decision was seen as a victory for corporate 
defendants, but it was not the kind of “knockout blow”95 that business 
leaders had sought against punitive damages. The Court failed to 
provide an ironclad numerical guidepost that may have instantly 
limited punitive damage awards in pending litigation, such as the 
cases involving Ford Explorer rollovers and Merck’s Vioxx 
complications.96 Still, the decision could help curb the size of product 
liability awards against companies given the new constitutional 
standard because multimillion dollar punitive verdicts are often 
based, at least in part, on the harmful impact of a product or 
corporate scheme to nonparties. 
 
 89. High Court Reviews Award Against Altria, CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 1, 2006, at C5. 
 90. Telephone Interview with Erwin Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law and 
Professor of Political Science, Duke University, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 12, 2006). 
 91. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 
2006 WL 153777. 
 92. Brief for Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 
2153785. 
 93. Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America et al. as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-
1256), 2006 WL 2153788. 
 94. Brief for American Insurance Association et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 
2252505. 
 95. Bravin & O’Connell, supra note 69. 
 96. Woolner, supra note 52. 
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Anti-tobacco organizations disagreed with the business 
community’s characterization of the case as a victory, correctly citing 
that the Court stopped short of articulating what level of punitive 
damage awards are unconstitutionally excessive.97 In addition, the 
Court still allows plaintiffs to present evidence of a company’s harm 
to the public at large for purposes of reprehensibility, which could 
sway a jury to punish on that basis despite jury instructions directing 
them otherwise.98 Moreover, the case failed to address the fairness of 
a group of “similarly situated potential plaintiffs to allow the first 
plaintiff who reached a jury to obtain punitive damages that punish a 
defendant for having harmed other potential plaintiffs whose cases 
are not then before the jury.”99 Thus, a defendant may not be able to 
argue that an earlier punitive damage award aimed at punishing the 
same conduct at issue in a current plaintiff’s lawsuit resulted in a 
punishment sufficient to mandate a dismissal in that plaintiff’s 
punitive damage claim.100 
Regarding the legal effect of the decision, the Court remanded the 
case to the Oregon Supreme Court for reconsideration given the new 
constitutional standard. It is expected that either a new trial will be 
ordered or the level of the punitive damage award will be adjusted.101 
The outcome of the remand may provide an early indication of the 
practical significance of the Court’s ruling in terms of breadth. 
Although the majority essentially suggests that a new trial is 
necessary, such a scenario may lead to a new jury struggling to 
interpret a difficult and confusing jury instruction. One commentator 
predicts that the Oregon Supreme Court could manipulate or 
interpret the language of its own earlier cases to “pass muster” within 
the Court’s new standard.102 For example, the Oregon court could find 
that the jury’s punitive damage award was not intended for other 
nonparty smokers, but was instead based on the reprehensibility of 
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Philip Morris’s conduct.103 But, if the Oregon court simply reinstates 
the punitive damages verdict, Philip Morris is likely to seek certiorari, 
arguing that the award is unconstitutionally excessive. 
State and federal trial judges will likely bear the burden of 
articulating this new, difficult standard in jury instructions. They must 
avoid giving directions that allow punishment for nonparty harm and 
properly instruct a jury on what Justice Ginsburg calls “our changing, 
less than crystalline precedent.”104 Thus, the Court’s holding has the 
potential to invalidate dozens of state statues and standard jury 
instructions.105 Considering the inability of nine Supreme Court 
justices to agree on the proper jury instructions for punitive damages, 
the average juror faces an uphill battle to grapple with an instruction 
that reflects the narrow distinction between consideration of nonparty 
harm for purposes of reprehensibility, and punishment based only on 
the harm to that particular plaintiff.106 Displaying his wry humor, 
Justice Souter acknowledged the practical difficulties of the decision, 
remarking, “[i]t’s a good thing we weren’t instructing that jury.”107 
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